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R ECENTLY the Civil Aeronautics Board examined the arrange-
ments by which travel agents are compensated by air carriers
for booking international air travel.' The primary question at issue
was whether all agents should be paid a uniform commission rate,
approved by the CAB, to which every member of the International
Air Transport Association (IATA) would then be bound, or
whether the rate should be "open", with each IATA member then
able independently to file any commission level whatsoever. From
1940 until April, 1975 IATA established a uniform commission
level for payments to its agents. Since 1956 the rate paid by IATA
members has been seven percent of the ticket price on point-to-point
scheduled travel and ten percent on inclusive tours. In April, 1975
a quasi-open system was begun, following the decision of four car-
riers to discontinue adherence to IATA's uniform intercarrier com-
mission agreement. In December, 1975 the carriers regrouped and
* Professor of Economics, University of Virginia; Special Economic Assistant
to the Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, 1970-71. B.A. 1963, Kala-
mazoo College; M.A. 1966, Ph.D. 1967, Michigan State University. The author
previously served as a consultant to the jointly represented carriers in CAB Docket
No. 28672, Agreements Involving Agency Matters. The views expressed in this
article are entirely his own.
1 Agreements Among Members of the International Air Transport Association
Involving Agency Matters, CAB Docket No. 28,672 [hereinafter cited as Agency
Matters]; CAB Order Nos. 75-12-141 (Dec. 29, 1975) and 76-7-56 (July 16,
1976). [The Administrative Law Judge hearing the Agency Matters case served
her initial decision after this article had been prepared for publication. Initial De-
cision, CAB Docket No. 28,672 (Mar. 15, 1978). The CAB has tentatively de-
cided to reject the Initial Decision and adopt an "open rate" policy. WALL ST. J.,
Jun. 9, 1978, at 11, col. 2 (S.W.ed.) Time did not permit revision of the article
to review these developments.-Eds.]
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adopted a new uniform commission rate.' However, the Civil Aero-
nautics Board (CAB) did not immediately approve this IATA reso-
lution under Section 412 of the Federal Aviation Act.' Instead the
CAB invited comments and heard oral arguments on the resolution."
Since this procedure produced an inadequate factual record, the
CAB, in July, 1976, ordered a full evidentiary hearing to determine
what payment mechanism would best serve the public interest.!
The question of commission determination is of interest to both
the carriers and the agents because of the sizable financial stakes
involved. Commissions are generally thought to be the third larg-
est cost item for airlines, following labor and fuel expenses; a
single percentage point increase in the commission rate entails over
twenty million dollars in commission payments.' The CAB's evi-
dentiary hearing, which ended in May, 1977, is also of interest
for reasons that transcend the narrow financial concerns of the
parties. The hearing drew together in one place data on the struc-
ture and conduct of the travel agent industry. It is now possible
to better understand the economic characteristics of this rapidly
growing service industry and its relationship with its customers
(the traveling public) and its clients (the international air trans-
port industry). Section II of this paper describes the evolution
and economics of this industry.
The evidentiary hearing, occurring during an era of strong
deregulation sentiment, also provides a revealing case study of
the potential dangers of deregulation whenever correlative regula-
tions remain extant. Deregulation is purported to produce benefits
for the consumer. But in this instance a naive deregulation pro-
posal runs counter to the economic interests of the traveling pub-
lic. Section III of this paper analyzes the different payment mech-
2 The new proposed levels were eight percent on point-to-point travel, and
11% on inclusive tours, plus a four percent incentive override for agents booking
at least 110% more business than the previous year. International Air Transport
Association (IATA) Resolution No. 002z (Dec. 10, 1975).
'The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C.
1382 (1970).
'CAB Order No. 75-12-141, supra note 1.
' CAB Order No. 76-7-56, supra note 1.
' United States carriers paid a total of $222.2 million in commissions in 1976,
representing 9.22 percent of their total passenger revenues. AIR TRANSPORT
WORLD, Oct., 1977, at 34. Twenty million dollars represents approximately one
percent of current carrier revenues. See Table 1, note 8 infra.
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anisms from the perspective of consumer welfare, in addition to
their financial impact upon carriers and agents.
Finally the Agency Matters hearing' raises again the question of
the appropriate standards by which the CAB is to integrate the
principles of antitrust with its own regulatory schema. Section IV
discusses this issue and proposes a benchmark for dovetailing
antitrust with CAB regulations.
II. THE TRAVEL AGENT INDUSTRY
The growth of the U.S. travel agent industry provides indirect
evidence of the positive income elasticity of air travel since the
demand for the services of this industry has outpaced the growth
in national income." Table 1 depicts the number of IATA ap-
proved travel agents and the number of locations they have op-
erated over a ten year period, as well as the value of U.S. agents'
international air travel bookings for three recent years. The growth
rate in agents and bookings exceeds that of the Gross National
Product during this time.
The structure of the industry, sans regulation, should engender
competitive behavior. There are thousands of independent firms,
so that collusion among all sellers would be extraordinarily diffi-
cult, if not impossible. Only in small and medium size cities might
the number of rivals be so small as to raise the specter of joint
behavior or tacit collusion. But supranormal returns on investment,
7 Supra note 1.
8 TABLE 1
1ATA AGENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
Number of Number of Int'l Air Travel GNP (billions)
Year Agents Locations Bookings (000,000's) U.S.
1966 4,425 5,701 $ 981.0
1967 4,785 6,041 1,007.7
1968 5,034 6,498 1,051.8
1969 5,362 6,994 1,078.8
1970 5,709 7,566 $1,176 1,975.3
1971 6,213 8,066 1,107.5
1972 6,422 8,790 1,733 1,171.1
1973 7,057 9,774 1,235.0
1974 8,122 10,600 2,059 1,217.8
1975 8,547 11,121 1,202.1
Adapted from Jointly Represented Carriers (JRC) Exhibit JRC-T-1, App. B.,
Agency Matters, supra note 1; Gross National Product in billions of 1972 dollars,
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 84 (1978).
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even then, should not be sustained long because there are no signifi-
cant barriers to entry by new firms. Only modest capital require-
ments must be met to open an agency.
Regulatory constraints, however, prevent this structural pattern
of many firms and easy entry from generating rigorous price
competition among travel agents. Indeed price competition be-
tween agents is prohibited by the: anti-rebating provisions of
Section 403 (b) of the Federal Aviation Act.! Agents may sell tick-
ets only at the current filed tariff rate, regardless of the size of the
commission they receive for writing the ticket. They cannot offer
tickets at reduced prices, in the manner an ordinary merchant
could choose to cut prices on merchandise. Nor can a ticket agent
rebate or refund any portion of the ticket price back to the cus-
tomer. The code of ethics of the largest association of domestic
travel agents went even beyond this. Until recently, the American
Society of Travel Agents' (ASTA) Code restrained competition
by forbidding the provision of discounts, gifts or rebates on com-
missions where the product or service price is unregulated-such
as hotels or rental cars."0 Recently this code of ethics was revised
in response to a seventy-five million dollar class; action antitrust
suit on behalf of customers of ASTA agents who were financially
penalized by the Code."
Even apart from their protection from price competition, travel
agents are a hybrid form of middleman. Functionally they are
retailers in that they sell to the ultimate consumer and collect
final payment. But they are also brokers. Unlike retailers they
do not break bulk or keep inventories and therefore do not bear
the same risks as traditional retailers. Their brokerage function
manifests itself in an array of commission schedules that yield
the following classification:
a. Basic: commissions paid on point-to-point travel and inclu-
sive tours.
b. Bonus commissions: extra payments on all tickets written
049 U.S.C. § 1373(b) (1970).
"American Society of Travel Agents, Principles of Professional Conduct
and Ethics, ASTA, INC. 1976 MEMBERSHIP ROSTER 567-69 (1976).
" see TRAVEL MANAGEMENT DAILY, Mar. 7, 1977, at 7; TRAVEL WEEKLY,
Mar. 7, 1977, at 81.
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for a particular route or fare. There are no group (or vol-
ume) requirements for this commission.
c. Volume incentives: extra payments to a travel agent produc-
ing more than a given volume of business for some desig-
nated time period.
d. Group overrides: extra payments for groups of :specified sizes.
Through the 1960's and into the 1970's, it was the industry
consensus, among both carriers and agents, that payments were
being made to agents, and especially to tour operators, in excess
of the rates set by IATA conference agreements. The exact amount
of such overpayments, if any, is not known, although the Director
General of IATA once asserted that they exceeded $100 million
per year." The payments were in the form of special commissions,
rebates or in-kind services. Some TATA members were later
indicted for these practices."
Most travel agencies belong to a national federation of similar
enterprises. These national federations constitute the membership
of the Universal Federation of Travel Agents Associations (UF-
TAA). UFTAA is a worldwide assembly of seventy-five nations on
six continents. UFTAA affiliated agents book approximately seventy
percent of all international air travel.' IATA recognizes UFTAA
as the representative of travel agents in its collective dealings with
agents.
The American Society of Travel Agents is the largest association
of travel agents in the U.S. and holds permanent representation
on the seventeen-member board of UFTAA. It has 6500 member
agencies in the U.S. and Canada and over 1500 members elsewhere
in the world.
The fact that larger agencies have a greater dollar volume per
employee suggests that there are economies of scale in the opera-
tion of an agency." This is corroborated by the growing percent-
" American Society of Travel Agents (ASTA) exhibit ASTA-RT-3, at 3-4,
Agency Matters, supra note 1 (testimony of John R. Balch).
13See the following consent decrees: CAB v. Braniff Airways, Inc., No.
C-76-590 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 1976); United States v. Air New Zealand, No.
C-76-0320-096 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 29, 1976); United States v. Air France, No.
75-C-1578 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1976).
"' Agency Matters, supra note 1, at 3 (testimony of Phillippe Bamberger).
"Louis HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES, INC., THE CHARACTER AND VOLUME OF THE
U.S. TRAVEL AGENCY MARKET 43 (1973). [This and other annual editions of this
publication hereinafter cited as 19-Harris Study, by year of publication.]
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age share of the market held by large agencies (over $1,000,000
in volume). In 1970 large agencies had fifty-eight percent of the
market; by 1974 they had sixty-seven percent. ' Even with the
growth in the scale of the optimum size plant, however, large
agencies are nowhere near dominating the industry. Indeed the
growth of the industry has been such that the absolute number of
large agents almost doubled during the 1970-1974 period."
There are no published statistics on the rate of return on in-
vestment for the U.S. travel agent industry. Inferential data, how-
ever, portray the industry as quite profitable. Table 118 is an example
of such evidence. One can presume that if profits were only nomi-
nal (or falling) the rate of entry into the industry would not be
so high (or would be negative). In 1975 the Department of
Transportation (DOT) released a report on U.S. travel agents
which gave the industry's deletion and default rate." Both are very
low. The deletion rate is the percentage of agents removed from
the lists of approved agents of both the Air Traffic Conference
(ATC, which deals with domestic flights) and IATA. From 1969
through 1973 it averaged only 2.5 percent. 0 The default rate is the
percentage of approved agents financially in default to either ATC
or IATA during a twelve month period. It varied from 0.4 to 1.6
percent."1 Retail industries with lesser financial vitality would show
much higher percentages than those cited in the DOT report.
Turning from the cost side of the agent industry to the demand
side, there are two important characteristics of the industry that
will be useful to delineate. One is the considerable discretion which
agents have in advising their customers. Agents are not mere order
takers. At the same time, the travel agent industry does not appear
to affect the position of the demand curve for international air
travel. Both of these characteristics are pertinent to the economic
analysis in the next section.
The demand for air travel is a function of such factors as per
10 1975 Harris Study, supra note 15, at 4.
"Id. The number of large agencies increased from 1,940 in 1970 to 3,795
in 1974.
"8 Note 8 supra.
"
9
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capita income, the value of time, air ticket prices, and the cost of
alternative modes of travel-all elements beyond the control of
travel agents. Travel agents can only shift demand as between
carriers-the overall market for travel is determined by forces
exogenous to the industry. In their study of domestic air transport,
George W. Douglas and James C. Miller saw no influence of travel
agents on the demand for air travel, nor did Mahlon R. Straszheim
in his study of international air travel."
The evidence on agent discretion is derived from a number of
surveys of travel agents taken in recent years.' These show that
travellers place great reliance upon their agents for advice on
mode of travel, schedules, choice of carrier, routing and even (in
the case of pleasure travel) destinations. This reliance upon the
agent's discretion is especially pronounced in the case of interna-
tional travel.
In domestic travel, customers are more frequent travelers and
may develop some personal knowledge about preferences for cer-
tain routes, schedules and carriers. In international travel, which
has a lower passenger frequency rate, a greater proportion of the
customers are also of the personal/pleasure variety as compared
to domestic air travel where the business proportion is higher."'
Travel agents book the preponderance of overseas air travellers:
from over fifty to eighty percent, depending upon the carrier.'
According to the evidence in industry surveys, the passenger typi-
cally relies upon the agent to choose the carrier. The Louis Harris
surveys credit the agent with determining the carrier in sixty-four
22 G. DOUGLAS & J. MILLER, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF DOMESTIC AIR TRANS-
PORT (1974); M. STRASZHEIM, THE INTERNATIONAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY (1969).
23 Compare 1971, 1973, 1975 Harris Studies, supra note 15; TOUCHE, ROSS &
Co., TRAVEL AGENT RESEARCH REPORT: SPRING 1975 SURVEY (1975); 1977
Harris Study, supra note 15.
In domestic travel, business trips bring in almost as many dollars
[to agents] as personal/pleasure trips; whereas in international tra-
vel, personal/pleasure bookings outearn business trips by more than
3:1. Domestic travel is obviously a market where the businessman
is a very important factor, whereas the international market is
heavily dominated by the vacationer.
1973 Harris Study, supra note 15, at 12; see also 1975 Harris Study, supra note
15, at 9.
' Exhibit JRC-T-3, at 16-17, Agency Matters, supra note 1 (written testimony
of Alfred R. Stout); written Jointly Represented Carriers Exhibits JRC-416, 418,
id.
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to seventy-five percent of the cases." In the retailing section this
represents an unusual degree of influnce in "brand" selection by
the sales personnel.
The surveys also present evidence on the question of whether
agents, in choosing among different travel alternatives, are influ-
enced by the size of the commissions being offered. This aspect of
agent conduct also has important bearing upon the economic an-
alysis in the next section. During the time of these surveys, travel
agents faced a generally uniform commission agreement, from
both domestic and international air carriers. But commissions did
differ as between destinations and hotels. A hotel's commission
policy was considered "very important" by seventy percent of the
agents as a selection factor." Forty-four percent of the agents
rated commission rates as one of the top factors in choosing desti-
nations for their customers."
In the CAB hearing on commissionse (despite the agent's incen-
tive to dissemble) evidence was produced indicating that some
agents would deliberately misbook a passenger on a less than
optimal flight in order to secure a higher commission made possible
under open rates. The American Automobile Association surveyed
its travel agents on the question of misbooking and found that sixty-
one percent believed that their personnel would lose their impar-
tiality when commission rates differed among carriers." The trade
press contained stories about misbooking after the April, 1975
termination of uniform rates. One agent in Illinois claimed that he
would route his Chicago-Rome passengers through New York, to
secure Alitalia's higher commission, rather than select TWA's direct
service from Chicago which paid a lower commission." Thomas
Cook, the world's largest travel agency, now pays its employees
cash bonuses, which are a reward for booking customers on airlines
20 1971 Harris Study, supra note 15, at 10; 1973 Harris Study, id. at 19; 1975
Harris Study, id. at 40.
27 1975 Harris Study, supra note 15, at 73.
28 1971 Harris Study, supra note 15, at 13.
2" Agency Matters, supra note 1.
" American Automobile Ass'n Exhibit, at 1, Agency Matters, supra note 1.
See also TRAVEL TRADE, Feb. 28, 1977, at 2.
8" TRAVEL WEEKLY, Jan. 20, 1977, at 71.
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offering favorable commissions.'
A Pan American-Alitalia episode evidences both the discretion
agents have over their customer's choice of carrier and the respon-
siveness of agents to differing commission levels.' When Pan
American renounced the uniform commission rate in April, 1975
it informed travel agents that it would pay a two percent override
commission on flights to Italy. Pan American's market share of the
U.S.-Italy market then increased. Alitalia, its main rival, countered
with a similar offer. Pan American then lost market share to
Alitalia until it responded with an eight to fifteen percent override
based on the agent's volume to and from Rome. Thereafter
Alitalia's market share declined until it reacted with a fifteen per-
cent override. An attorney for ASTA wrote: "It is clear from my
conversations with Pan Am representatives, DOT and State De-
partment officials that the reason Pan Am is experiencing this
highly favorable traffic growth is because of increased support from
travel agents." Only after Alitalia increased its commission level
was this "support" shifted to Pan American's rival so it then was
able to regain market share.' During this time TWA also responded
by raising its commission rates. It finally took the efforts of the
Italian government, a supporter of uniform commission levels,
to secure a partial rollback in these commission levels.' A TWA
marketing executive testified during the CAB hearings as to the
mechanics of the bidding process engendered by open commis-
sions. A portion of his description merits recounting:
The way our ad hoc system works is as follows. A sales agent
[travel agent] will typically call one of our sales managers to in-
form him that he wishes to book a group of passengers on a TWA
flight at some point in the future. He will then ask what override
we are willing to pay. When my office receives a report of such a
call (we generally receive at least 30 such contacts a day and
often as many as 60), we decide how much to offer in order to
obtain the business. We look at the fare basis, the date of the
32 TRAVEL AGENT, Oct. 28, 1976, at 4.
3 The Pan American-Alitalia incidents were narrated in the statement of
Guido Vittori, Exhibit JRC-T-9, at 1-4, Agency Matters, supra, note 1.
Exhibit JRC-442, Agency Matters, supra note 1 (memo, Paul S. Quinn to
American Society of Travel Agents Air Committee).
Statement of Guido Vittori, supra note 33.
230 AVIATION DAILY 178 (1977).
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flight, and the amount of the space already booked on that flight.
We then check with our market planning staff to determine how
many bookings are likely to be made on that flight, to determine
the likelihood that we will be able to fill the seats in any event.
Generally speaking, we know what the going rate is on any route,
and if we decide that we need the business, we will make an offer.
At at later point, the agent may come back to us and say that
another airline has made him a better offer, and ask whether we
wish to match it. We then will go through the same exercise, to
determine how important this particular business is to us.3"
This procedure is an expected one under a regime of open com-
missions given the peculiar price and cost characteristics of inter-
national air passenger transportation, a topic addressed in the
following section.
III. THE ECONOMICS OF ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT MECHANISMS
A. The Carriers and Open Commissions
Carriers find open rates more costly because of three character-
istics of their industry not generally found among sellers of other
goods and services. These are: (1) carriers and their agents are
prohibited by law from offering rebates on their tariff rates; (2)
the product being sold, an airplane seat on a scheduled flight, can-
not be inventoried if unsold; (3) the difference between the price
and the marginal cost of the product (i.e., the cost of adding a
passenger on an unfilled plane) is significant."8 Absent these char-
acteristics, carriers likely would be indifferent to various travel
agent payment mechanisms. They would pay approximately the
same amount in aggregate commission costs under either open
or closed rates.
Since these characteristics are not absent, however, a scenario
familiar to the economist comes into play: the fallacy of composi-
tion. What is true of a part is considered to be also true for the
whole. In a microcosm, each individual airline views its situation
in this manner: assume an unsold seat on a particular flight pres-
" Exhibit JRC-T-7, at 15-16, Agency Matters, supra note 1 (written testimony
of Roger E. Chase, Jr.).
"The marginal cost of adding a passenger to an unfilled plane is estimated
to be only approximately thirty-eight dollars for a New York-London round trip
flight. See Exhibit JRC-408. See also Exhibits JRC-409-410, Agency Matters,
supra note 1.
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ently exists; the seat, like generated electricity, cannot be "stored"
for future sale; the cost to transport and service a passenger in
that seat is $X; and the filed tariff for the flight is several multiples
of $X. Since the airline cannot offer a lower price for that unfilled
seat, there is a financial incentive to induce a travel agent to shift
a customer to that carrier's flight from a rival's through the offer
of a higher commission. As discussed in Section II supra, the pas-
senger cannot lawfully share in this inducement. But as long as
this payment is less than the difference between the carrier's mar-
ginal cost of adding a passenger and the ticket price for that flight,
the carrier's profitability has been improved by the increased com-
mission payment.
The assumption of the extra seat is not unrealistic. In the past
decade the annual passenger load factor has never been above
fifty-six percent on scheduled international service.' The average
passenger load factor for the decade 1966-1975 was 53.4 percent.'
This figure does not vary greatly from market to market. For exam-
ple, the heavily travelled North Atlantic market has an average pas-
senger load factor of about fifty-four percent; in the North Mid-
Pacific the load factor was fifty-one percent.'
As the individual carrier begins to fill seats on its scheduled
flights, the immediate upshot is a greater payment to its agents
and greater profits for itself. But what was rational economic be-
havior by one carrier becomes irrational as all carriers participate.
As rival firms note the shift in their traffic, they too will (and
must) escalate their commission payments. In the process costs
increase for all carriers, profits decline for the industry and there
is a transfer of dollars from carriers to agents.
In some industrial settings, the individual firms would perceive
the overall irrationality of singularly rational behavior, join rank,
and restrain their efforts. The fallacy of composition would not
be operative. This is purportedly what might keep, say, an alumi-
num firm from cutting price on virgin ingot. But in the aluminum
industry the ton of ingot, if not sold one day, is available for sale
the next. The unfilled seat is not. Also, the difference between
the ingot's market price and its cost of production is not pro-
"'Exhibits JRC-401-402, Agency Matters, supra note 1.
4 0 Exhibit JRC-402, id.
41 Id.
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nounced. The marginal cost of another passenger is usually very
modest compared to the ticket price." Moreover, in the airlines
industry the propensity to break rank is exacerbated by the exist-
ence of nationalized carriers who have operating goals other than
profit maximization." As a result of these factors, commission
costs increased under the quasi-open rates situation of April, 1975,
and thereafter.
The precise increase in commission costs attributable to open
commissions proved difficult to calculate in the CAB's investiga-
tion because the exact extent of unauthorized overpayments under
the prior uniform rate scheme could not be ascertained. As men-
tioned, prior to the Pan American break, the CAB-approved uni-
form commission was seven percent for point-to-point travel with
an additional three percent for inclusive tours. Taking that as the
normal base prior to April, 1975, carriers filing commission sched-
ules with the CAB now offer a base of at least eight percent (TWA,
Alitalia, Air France and others offer ten percent, plus overrides),
with maximum rates for major carriers generally exceeding twenty
percent." LOT Polish Airlines, as of May, 1977, had on file a
schedule setting commission levels up to thirty-one percent on
New York-Warsaw flights." Korean Airlines offered a maximum
incentive commission of thirty percent to be paid on top of its
standard eleven percent for inclusive tour travel.'
One estimate placed the additional cost of open commissions
to U.S. carriers alone at $98 million for 1976."' ASTA estimated
that during 1978 commission rates would reach ten percent for
point-to-point travel with a three percent override, for inclusive
tours. 8 The carriers represented in the CAB hearing estimated that
1978 commission expenses would be over eleven percent of passen-
ger revenues."' This estimate is revealing when compared with the
ISee note 38 supra.
41 M. STRASZHEIM, supra note 22, at 8-30.
4Examples of recent commission rates filed with the CAB pursuant to Part
253 of the Economic Regulations, 14 C.F.R. §§ 253.1-253.5 (1977), are found in
Exhibits JRC-429-432, Agency Matters, supra note 1.
'Filing pursuant to Part 253, note 44 supra, April 29, 1977.
"Note 44 supra.
' Agency Matters, supra note 25, at 44.
4 Agency Matters, supra note 1, at 2 (written testimony of Paul W. Faulk-
ner).
"Exhibit JRC-T-3, supra note 25, at 43.
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experience of earlier years. In 1966 commissions to agents averaged
only 4.2 percent of passenger revenues for international carriers;
by 1974 this had risen to 5.7 percent," an annual growth rate of 3.9
percent. As open commissions came into play in 1975 and 1976,
commission expenses were increasing at rates of over twenty per-
cent per year."
The record of bargaining between airlines and agents corrobo-
rates the hypothesis that commission costs escalate under open
rates. The filings of international carriers show large increases in
the quantity of special bonus commissions paid as open com-
missions became a part of the industry's economic conduct."' In
addition, the very fact that the carriers oppose while ASTA favors
open commissions" supports, the hypothesis that commission pay-
ments are (and will be) larger under an open than a closed
system.
There are, however, three economic reservations from the gen-
eral proposition that open rates will cause commission costs of
carriers to escalate. The first is the potential tempering of the
escalation by high carrier load factors. If load factors increase, then
the number of seats for which the pronounced discrepancy be-
tween price and marginal costs exists will be low. The pressure
for increased commissions would be dampened, although appar-
ently not stymied. Even during the peak summer season of 1977,
TWA and at least five other carriers jumped their point-to-point
commission rate by twenty-five percent.YASTA claimed that the
increased commissions they would receive under open rates could
be used to advertise air travel, to the benefit of the airlines.' But if
there existed an unexploited market demand shift that could be
50 Id. at 22.
51 Id. at 23-26; Exhibit JRC-426, Agency Matters, supra note 1.
62 For example, in September, 1976 British Airways paid only nineteen special
bonuses. Reply Brief of the Jointly Represented Carriers at 12, Agency Matters,
supra note 1. In October, 1976, the number had risen to 158. Id. British Air-
ways' filing for August, 1977 cited almost 1300 such payments. Id.
"Compare Brief of the American Society of Travel Agents, Inc., at 51; Trial
Brief of Jointly Represented Carriers, at 106, Agency Matters, supra note 1.
s4 Jointly Represented Carriers Proposed Findings of Fact at 78-79, Agency
Matters, supra note 1. See also filings under Part 253, supra note 44, by Air
France (July 5, 1977); TWA (July 11, 1977); Alitalia (July 18, 1977).
11 Brief of the American Society of Travel Agens, Inc., supra note 53, at
43-44.
1978]
60 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [44
tapped by advertising, carriers themselves would have an incentive
to undertake the promotional campaign. Airlines are more eco-
nomical buyers of advertising than agencies.
Second, even though a regime of open commissions significantly
increases carrier payments to the travel agent industry, agencies will
not receive supranormal profits in the long run. Given the eco-
nomic structure of the travel agent industry, the likely result of
open commissions would be that the initial increase in profitability
of the industry would attract even more entries to its ranks than
before. Since agencies are prohibited from competing on the basis
of price, non-price blandishments would be utilized (to the extent
permitted by law) to attract customers. The result would be ex-
cess capacity in the travel agent industry and an inefficiently large
amount of resources flowing into non-price rivalry.
The final reservation pertains to the role of monopsony' power
in the market for agent services. A considerable portion of the
objections of the CAB's Bureau of Operating Rights (BOR) to
uniform commission agreements focused on this issue, and the
BOR's brief even included a technical appendix outlining monop-
sony theory for non-economist readers."' The document provides
a nice illustration of Kenneth Boulding's famous assertion that
a little economics can be a dangerous thing.
The monopsony issue can be put simply enough. A monopsonist
is a buyer upon whom input sellers are so dependent that the
buyer has significant control (or discretion) over the price it pays
for its inputs. Economic theory holds that a monopsonist, if left
to itself, will pay a price which is too low, and that as a result an
inefficiently small quantity of resources will be drawn into the
factor market. The BOR brief, drawing heavily upon George
Stigler price theory text,' adequately demonstrates this proposi-
tion. The BOR then concludes that since a monopsonist pays too
little, IATA uniform commission rates were (and would be) too
low; open commissions, because they produce higher commissions,
yield an improvement in economic efficiency."
" See generally G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 205-07 (3d ed. 1966).
" Brief of the Bureau of Operating Rights at App. A, Agency Matters, supra
note 1.
U Supra note 56.
"Brief of the Bureau of Operating Rights, supra note 57.
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What the BOR brief neglects, in spite of its focus upon the
monopsony question, is to demonstrate that IATA has monopsony
power in the purchase of agent services. This gap in the BOR's
argument is explicable in that no such showing could be made.
The non-human costs of a travel agency (such as office space,
phones, and typewriters) are obviously not tied in any way to the
peculiar nature of the travel agent industry. Therefore IATA
could not pay a monopsonistic commission level and have such
factors of production attracted away from alternative uses. The
same applies for human inputs. The travel agent is not tied to his
or her profession in the same manner as the employee in the com-
mon textbook examples of monopsony: the textile worker in the
Southern mill town, the drafted professional athlete, the drafted
soldier. Travel agent personnel have alternatives that bar their ex-
ploitation. The best proof of the absence of monopsony exploitation
is that individiuals not yet licensed as travel agents (and therefore
not yet committed to the profession), but who are working for and
can observe the compensation of existing travel agents, continue
to decide to enter the profession." This behavior would be irra-
tional if their compensation were below an open market level.
Individuals do not voluntarily queue up to be exploited by monop-
sonists.
B. Consumers and Open Commissions
The quality of advice rendered by agents will be lower under
open commissions than at an appropriate uniform commission
level. Under uniform commissions an agent's incentive in advising
customers as between airlines is unambiguous: discerning the cus-
tomer's best interest is basically identical with the agent's financial
interest. But under open rates, whenever commissions differ be-
tween carriers, the agent's interests may run at cross purposes
with the traveler's. A higher commission on a less desirable flight
provides a perverse incentive to the agent to misbook the passenger.
Misbooking will not occur in every potential instance. Agents
benefit from repeat business, and, if afraid that the suboptimal
booking will be later discovered, they may take the smaller com-
mission against that chance. Business travellers will be suboptimally
"'See generally the annual Harris Studies, supra note 15.
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booked less than pleasure/personal passengers; domestic passen-
gers will be suboptimally booked less than international travellers."
A supply curve for misbooking by travel agents would show
the number of passengers misbooked as a function of the dollar
differential in commission rates. This relationship would be a
direct one and the supply curve would begin at the origin since,
in the absence of differential commissions, there is no perverse
incentives to misbook. The slope of the curve would be deter-
mined by the agent's professional ethics and the agent's expecta-
tion of the misbooking being discovered. For this latter reason,
the supply elasticity will be larger for international air travel than
domestic; that is, a given commission differential will provoke a
larger quantity of misbooking in international travel because of
greater consumer ignorance and lower travel frequency.2 The size
of the differential offered by one carrier relative to its rivals will
be a function, in part, of load factors, the expected reaction times
of rival carriers, and the extent to which agents will continue to
favor the initiating carrier after others have matched the higher
commission.
The financial inducement to misbook a single passenger can
be significant. For example, in 1977 Alitalia paid a fifteen percent
override on flights from the U.S. to Italy, resulting in a total com-
mission of up to twenty-six percent of the ticket fare." TWA was
one carrier that did not match the increase. The result was that on
a round trip economy flight from New York to Rome booked on
Alitalia, the agent received a commission, of $190.44; the same
flight booked on TWA yielded only $90.38 in agency compensa-
tion.-
Open rates affect consumers adversely not only by raising the
probability of being misbooked, but also by increasing what
economists call "search costs." Under uniform rates, the main
incentive a traveller had to check with another agent on travel
plans was the chance that the first agent had unconsciously mis-
stated the alternatives. Under open rates, the traveller has an in-
1 See notes 23-24 supra, and accompanying text.
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centive to inquire with rival agencies to try and ascertain if the
first agency purposely misstated the alternatives.
In spite of the misbooking problem, ASTA's position in the
CAB hearing was that consumers could still benefit under open
rates because, with the expanded commission revenues, their mem-
bers would offer more amenities (flight bags, maps, etc.) and
remain open longer hours in more locations.' This, it was sug-
gested, would more than offset any lessened quality of service or
higher ticket prices which airlines would be forced to impose be-
cause of higher commission costs." The argument is flawed.
If consumers valued increased travel agent services more than
airline services, it would have been in the economic self interest
of IATA members voluntarily to raise the uniform commission
rate which all members paid so that the travel agent industry
could afford to make such services available. IATA members
could then have exploited, in the form of increased air travel,
some of the revenues from this untapped component of consumer
preferences.
In addition to misbooking and search costs, there are other
potential costs to consumers of open commissions. Air passengers
may pay higher ticket prices, receive less service from the carriers,
or some combination of the two as a result of open commissions.
Unless carriers are able to pay the increased commission costs
out of profits, or they are absorbed as losses by carrier owners,
carriers will have no choice but to respond either with applications
for higher fares, an increase in passenger load factors, or a re-
duction in flights or flight services. Carrier profitability in recent
years has been modest. Since 1969 U.S. carriers have earned less
than six percent on investment each year on the international seg-
ment of their business.
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C. The Government and Open Commissions
The carriers and agents have an obvious interest in the dispute
over commission payment mechanisms. Less apparent is the ra-
tionale of two government agencies which participated in the hear-
ing: the Department of Transportation and the Antitrust Division
63 Brief of the American Society of Travel Agents, Inc., supra note 53.
" Id.
' Exhibit JRC-T-3, supra note 25, at 10.
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of the Department of Justice. Both opposed uniform commissions."'
DOT's support of open commissions is the more difficult to
trace since that agency has from its inception had troubles bring-
ing itself into focus. Its efforts on behalf of travel agents in this
proceeding may be a manifestation of its inability to decide upon
its position regarding the more general question of transportation
deregulation.
One of the objections raised by DOT to uniform commissions
was that, given the peculiar incentive structure faced by airlines,
any uniform agreement rate would be breached, especially during
times of low load factors." Unabated breaching, of course, results
in a de facto open system, but conceptually this is not an objection
to uniform rates. Under a fixed uniform commission, even with
widespread breaches, there will be less loss to the public interest
than would occur under an untrammeled open system. Even par-
tial observance is better than none. The remedy for breaching is
an improved system of detection and conviction.
Under the CAB's recent adoption of Part 253 of its Economic
Regulations," the probability of deviations from filed commission
rates is reduced. Each carrier now must fully disclose and file
its commission schedule with the CAB. To deviate from this filed
rate is an unfair method of competition and not, as previously was
the case, only a violation of an IATA resolution. Part 253 applies
to both open and uniform rates and serves to inhibit illegal re-
bating. In addition IATA has expanded its own enforcement staff.
The recent indictment of some airlines for rebating" also raises
the deterrence against this practice. It should also be noted that
most of the pre-1975 breaches of the IATA commission agree-
ments involved payments to wholesale tour operators, not retail
travel agents."
Unlike DOT, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department
has had a rather clear view of what. its role should be, who its
4" Brief of the United States Department of Transportation, at 3 and Brief of
the United States Department of Justice, at 3, Agency Matters, supra note 1.
"' Brief of the United States Department of Transportation, supra note 68.
70Supra note 44. Part 253 became effective September 1, 1976. See Regula-
tions ER-961 (July 16, 1976); PS-70 (July 16, 1976).
7 See supra note 14.
72See supra note 12.
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constituency is, and what its goals are. Because of its past con-
cern with the consumer's welfare, the Division's position in favor
of open agency commissions ' is a curious one and worthy of
inspection.
The Antitrust Division has had a long history of battling resale
price maintenance (or fair trade) laws. In 1975 that battle was
successfully consummated," with consumers much in debt to this
agency for its efforts. Yet in the CAB's agency commission in-
vestigation, the Antitrust Division found itself supporting open
commissions, in effect a form of resale price maintenance. The
parallels are obvious. Price competition among travel agents is
precluded by law. Therefore any rivalry among agencies must be
of the non-price variety. One of the vices of resale price mainten-
ance, according to traditional doctrine, is that non-price competi-
tion becomes excessive and not as beneficial to the consumer as
the reduced prices which would be possible without fair trade.
Consumers are forced to pay for services they do not value as
much as the lower prices foregone. This type of excessive non-
price competition will prevail in the travel agent industry under
open rates, and the adverse economic effects will be exacerbated
by the perverse incentive to misbook when commission rates differ
among carriers. In addition, open rates, as shown earlier, raise
the probability of higher ticket prices for consumers relative to
those which would prevail under uniform rates. How then does the
Antitrust Division support its position?
Students of the Antitrust Division realize that the Division
tends to react reflexively and sometimes irrationally to certain
words. "Concentration" and "regulation" are two of these terms.
There are also acronyms that fall in this semantic category, such
as IBM, GE, and AT&T. Taxonomically, IATA falls into this
group as well. In the investigation of agreements among IATA
members involving agency matters, the Antitrust Division's re-
sponse may parallel that of Nathaniel, who upon hearing that Jesus
of Nazareth was the awaited Messiah purportedly said, "Can there
any good thing come out of Nazareth?"' The Antitrust Division
would wonder: can anything good come out of IATA?
73 Brief of the United States Department of Justice, supra note 68.
74 Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801.
t 5 John 1:46.
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Shorthand responses to economic questions can be rational.
Rules of thumb can be helpful, but they also can lead to mistakes.
The only intellectually redeeming aspect of the Antitrust Division's
position might be strategic. That is, by supporting open commis-
sions the Justice Department may recognize the costs it is imposing
upon consumers, but find these costs outweighed by the chance
that open commissions will so rend the economic fabric of IATA
that in the long run its rate fixing powers will end and a completely
free market in air transport will prevail.
In this instance, however, that end which may be hoped to
justify the means will not be secured. While criticisms of IATA's
joint rate making propensities have been common,' no critic has
been able to devise a scheme or policy whereby an open and
efficient market could be substituted for the IATA mechanism.
The reasons are rooted in the economic nature of markets. One
of the preconditions for markets to function freely is that property
rights be clearly defined and exchangeable. In some industries,
governments exercise no restraint over property rights and interna-
tional trade thrives. Calculators, watches and capital equipment
are examples. But no government is likely to renounce sovereignty
over its air space and permit unfettered exit from and entrance
over its borders by way of air travel. Without this, a precondition
for a genuine free market in air transport is unmet. The prospect
for an efficient open market in international air transport is further
lessened due to the subsidization by some foreign governments of
their flag carriers.
IV. ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THE UNREGULATED MIDDLEMAN
There is an unnamed law in economics: if one activity is regu-
lated, then another will have to be too. The principle derives from
the interdependence of economic phenomena-what economists
call in another context "general equilibrium." For example, when it
was deemed desirable to control the price of unfinished sheet ply-
" See R. CHUANG, THE INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSORT ASSOCIATION (1972);
W. O'CONNOR, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF THE WORLD'S AIRLINES (1971); K.
PILLAI, THE AIR NET (1969); M. STRASZHEIM, supra note 22. For a sobering view
of the prospect of global competition from a former CAB commissioner, see J.
Robson, Global Aviation: A Soaring Industry, a Mired Bureaucracy, Washington
Post, Oct. 15, 1977, at A15, col. 1.
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wood, this could not effectively be accomplished without control-
ling the price of finished plywood as well. Running unfinished
plywood over a jointer put it in the (uncontrolled) finished prod-
uct market. Such examples are familiar to economists formerly
employed by the Office of Price Administration or its more recent
successors.
The reverse of this law is also true: it can prove difficult to suit-
ably deregulate one arena in the economy if nearby areas remain
controlled. The Agency Matters proceeding" is an example of this.
Should commission costs be uniformly paid by all carriers and
the level maintained by administrative fiat or determined "openly"
by independent carrier action? In an era when the case for de-
regulation of domestic air transportation has been so carefully
made," the question seems to answer itself, especially when open
(or, more precisely, "flexible") commissions and markups are
standard fare for middlemen marketing thousands of goods and
services. Since a travel agent is generically no more than a middle-
man between a passenger and a carrier, an open payments mech-
anism might seem akin to the method most commonly in use.
The distinction lies in the correlative regulatory mechanisms still
operating upon carriers and agents. As discussed earlier, the mid-
dleman-ticket agent cannot, by law, offer a lower price (or a re-
bate) to a passenger. In genuinely open markets, a middleman,
financially induced by one seller to "push" that product, can
offer a lower price to customers in response. Thus, in the case of
most goods and services, if a manufacturer offers a lower price
(or higher markup) to a retailer, the individual retailer has an in-
centive to promote that particular product. The incentive also
exists to offer it at a lower price. Indeed, competition from other
similarly situated retailers may dictate a price reduction to con-
sumers. Genuinely open commissions would thus hold forth the
prospects of lower prices to consumers.
This has been the impetus for other efforts by the Antitrust
Division to open up previously blocked price competition among
"7Note 1 supra.
" See, inter alia, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure,
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Civil Aeronautics Board Practice and Pro-
cedure, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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middlemen, e.g., securities dealers,"" commodity brokers,"0 and real
estate agents. 1 In each of these instances, the middlemen's fees,
if competitively determined, held forth the prospect of a cost re-
duction to some if not all customers. The Antitrust Division has
also entered consent decrees with other service industry associ-
ations that enjoin those associations from inhibiting their mem-
bers from engaging in price competition." But any analogies be-
tween these situations and that of agents selling international air
transportation are inapposite as long as ticket prices cannot be
altered or adjusted by the travel agents. Instead, under the current
regulatory framework regarding tariffs and rebates, "open" com-
missions hold forth the prospect of suboptimal booking, higher
fares and lower flight quality for consumers.
In Section 102 of the Federal Aviation Act the CAB is directed
to consider the "competitive impact" of its decisions." This is
regularly construed to entail a balancing of antitrust principles of
free competition against other public interest goals attainable only
through collective or regulatory action. Much ink has been spilled
about the appropriate balance and tradeoff.
In the Agency Matters investigation," the issue was raised as
to whether uniform rates, because they entail collective action, are
so repugnant to antitrust principles as to override any other possible
public interest factors. In legal terms, the determination hinges
initially on whether a rule of reason or a per se standard is to be
the appropriate criterion. By the per se approach, the IATA agree-
"' The Antitrust Division provided the intellectual stimulus, as well as much
of the political push, for the elimination of fixed minimum stock brokerage com-
missions. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11203 (Jan. 23, 1975); Securities
Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97.
"See Brief of United States as Intervenor, Thill Securities Corp. v. New
York Stock Exchange, No. 63-C-264 (E.D. Wis. May 1, 1973).
"1United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (1950);
United States v. Greater Pittsburgh Bd. of Realtors 1973-1 TRADE CASES (CCH)
5 74,454; United States v. Real Estate Bd. of New York, Inc., 1974-2 TRADE
CASES (CCH) 5 75,350.
" United States v. American Institute of Architects, 1972 TRADE CASES (CCH)
5 73,981; United States v. American Soc. of Civil Engineers, 1972 TRADE CASES
(CCH) 5 73,950; United States v. American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants, Inc., 1972 TRADE CASES (CCH) 5 74,007.
8349 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970). See also United States v. CAB, 511 F.2d 1315,
1320 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
84Supra note 1.
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ments are unpalatable on their face. ' The rule of reason standard
permits a cost-benefit evaluation of uniform commission agree-
ments."
There is little question that in markets devoid of regulatory con-
straints, the per se benchmark regarding the fixing of prices and
rates is appropriate." But in markets or industries partially regu-
lated, such as air transportation, the economic case for a rule of
reason is forceful. As mentioned earlier, the interdependence of
regulated behavior with "open" elements can negate the expected
benefits of independent economic action. A rule of reason permits
the CAB to be mindful of these interdependencies.
The ultimate performance goal of any industry, after all, is not
adherence to antitrust principles. Antitrust is a means to a social
end. One desired end of antitrust is the efficient use of resources
as determined by consumer preferences." As Adam Smith put it
long ago: "Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all pro-
duction; and the interest of the producer ought to be attended to,




In many industries forcing the economic actors to behave in-
dependently achieves efficiency. In the context of travel agent
commissions, exactly the opposite is the case. To argue that inde-
pendent action is dictated by "antitrust principles" when this re-
sults in inefficient resource utilization and detriment to the con-
sumer is to stand the principles of antitrust on their heads. A far
more workable and consistent focus for the CAB would be to
adhere to rules of decision that yield the desired fruits of antitrust:
consumer sovereignty and prices in line with alternative opportu-
nity costs. Semantically, much legal confusion could be avoided if
the CAB were to hold that pursuing the "principles of antitrust"
" The most robust presentation of the per se rule is United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
"See Bd. of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 23 1,
238 (1918). A recent important review of the rule of reason is found in Con-
tinental TV, Inc. v. GTE-Sylvania, Inc., - U.S. -_, 97 S.Ct. 2549 (1977).
87 The classic defense of the per se approach is Adams, The 'Rule of Reason':
Workable Competition or Workable Monopoly, 63 YALE L.J. 348 (1954).
88 Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency,
What Else Counts?, 125 UNIV. OF PENN. L. REV. 1191 (1977).
"A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 625 (Med. Lib. 2 ed. 1937).
19781
70 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [44
refers to the pursuit of ends, not means. The question before the
Board then becomes, what is the impact of the action upon the
consumer's welfare? In some market settings, then, the competi-
tive market model adroitly will show collective action to be con-
trary to the pursuit of this end. But in regulated sectors, the pur-
suit of the ends of competition may require collective action. The
decision to allow uniform action by carriers in this proceeding on
the grounds of consumer welfare is simplified not only because
this would be consistent with the "sound development of an air
transportation system""0 but also because it provides a setting where
retail travel agents have flourished and grown in numbers. In
this regard, uniform commissions also further the "antitrust prin-
ciple" of promoting small enterprise."
V. CONCLUSION
The CAB's investigation of travel agency commissions went
only to the question of the desirability of a uniform versus an open
commission regime. The optimal level of payments itself was not
an issue in the proceeding (nor in this paper)." If the CAB rules
in favor of uniform commissions, then the question of the appro-
priate level or range of commission payments will have to be
addressed.
If the CAB decides in favor of open commissions, then the vari-
ous rates independently paid by carriers for the brokering of inter-
national air travel must be filed with the CAB and that agency
must decide upon whatever compliance measures it deems appro-
priate to enforce them. Beyond this, no administrative determi-
nation of commission levels need be taken. The CAB could dis-
allow proposed commissions as excessive, but to do so would
eliminate one alleged advantage of open commissions (that their
levels require no administrative evaluation or determination), and
0049 U.S.C. § 1302(d) (1970).
O"See United States v. Aluminum Corp. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d
Cir. 1945); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 316 (1962); Elzinga,
note 88 supra, at 1196-1200.
92 "The investigation . . . is not to consider any additional questions . . .such
as the appropriate level of commission rates." CAB Order No. 76-7-56, supra
note 1, at 8. "The issue of whether the levels of the proposed commission rates
are fair and equitable to all concerned is separate and distinct from the issue of
whether the fixing of uniform rates of commissions to travel agents by agree-
ment among the carriers is adverse to the public interest." Id. at n.24.
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is a concession that an open rate regime, unlike a true open market,
is not self-regulating.
Under open commissions, consumers and carriers would be the
losers. Carrier costs would increase (as they already have), with
no corresponding increase in the demand for their product. Con-
sumers would lose the impartial advice available under uniform
rates, as well as face the prospect of higher fares, poorer carrier
service or both. Further, what carriers and consumers lose under
open commissions is not matched by what agents gain. In the
long run the transfer of revenues from carriers to agents would
attract more agents into this service industry, and those agents
would compete away excess profits through excess non-price
rivalry."
If open commissions are mandated, other changes in the indus-
try can also be expected. The historic decline in the use of carrier-
owned city ticket offices (CTO's) probably would be reversed. At
present most carriers generate far less than half their bookings
through CTO's."' Still, under open commissions, CTO's would
not come to dominate the retailing of tickets. In all but the largest
of cities, the market is too thin for each international carrier to
have a CTO situated therein. The use of toll-free numbers-an
imperfect surrogate for a CTO-would be more extensively pro-
moted by carriers seeking to circumvent the high commissions pay-
able to retail agents under the open rate system.
Another likely outcome, as both carriers and passengers be-
come disenchanted by the economic effects of open commissions,
would be a move to a net fare concept. This would represent a
true open commission regime, in contrast to that being considered
by the CAB, which is open only on the supply but not on the
demand side. Under a net fare system, a passenger for interna-
tional air service would pay the retail travel agent an amount
which is the sum of the filed tariff on the airline plus a commission
for the agent's services. The agent then would return an amount
equal to the filed tariff to the airline upon whom the ticket was
written, and retain whatever commission it was able to charge. All
"3See Stigler, Price and Non-Price Competition, 76 J. POLITICAL ECONOMY
149 (1968).
"See Exhibit JRC-T-7, supra note 37, at 2; Exhibit JRC-T-6, Agency Matters,
supra note 1 (written testimony of Russell Thayer); Exhiibt JRC-416, Id.
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agents would pay the same amount for a ticket on a particular
carrier for a particular flight. But agents could attempt to charge
whatever commission they desired for their services associated
with booking the flight.
The structural characteristics of the travel agent industry, dis -
cussed in Section II above, would, in the absence of collusion,
prevent the setting of excessive commission surcharges. In addi-
tion, commission charges would then vary to reflect different
services proffered. A complicated itinerary, with numerous stop-
overs, would prompt a higher commission payment. In like fashion,
agents offering extensive counseling or amenities for a given inter-
national flight could, in an open market, charge a higher price if
consumers desired such services. But unlike the situation under an
open commission system, consumers who do not value these extra
services would not have to pay for them." The only economic
complication would be a free-rider problem in some ticket sales.
Under net fares, a passenger seeking extensive counseling could
secure this at one agency, then purchase the ticket at another
which charged a lower markup. This would induce agencies of
the first sort to offer a suboptimal level of service since they would
not capture the gains from their greater efforts." The circumven-
tion of the free rider problem is one of the economic advantages
of the IATA uniform commission proposal. The free rider problem,
however, would not exist with respect to tangible amenities (flight
bags, etc.) since they would not be extended except in the case
of a sale.
Already, as the effects of open commissions have become ap-
parent, the airline industry has begun to examine the net fare con-
cept more seriously."7 Under open fares, airlines could offer tickets
to their own (and other) CTO's at the same price as to independ-
,3 In a world of costless information and zero transaction costs, the same re-
suits as a net fare concept could be approached under open commissions if the
rebating restrictions on travel agents were removed. In such a frictionless mar-
ket, competition would force agents to rebate part of any excessive commissions
back to consumers, thereby lowering the real price paid for tickets. Given con-
sumer ignorance of flight alternatives, however, the problem of agent impar-
tiality, not present under either uniform commissions or net fares, would remain
extant.
91 For an analysis of the "free rider" problem, see R. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAw 149-51, 160 (1976).
97See 288 AVIATION DAILY 52 (1976); TRAVEL AGENT, Mar. 31, 1976, at 1.
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ent retail agents so that CTO's would provide in some markets a
source of competition to independent agents.
An examination of the sizable volume, Agreeing Fares and
Rates: A Survey of the Methods and Procedures Used by the
Member Airlines of the International Air Transport Association,"
is an interesting exercise. The IATA regulations show the inter-
dependence of air routes and fares to different regions and coun-
tries, the labyrinthian procedures for resolving carrier differences,
and the difficulties such an institution encounters when competitive
strategies of one sort flare up because competitive actions of an-
other kind are institutionally constrained. One is reminded that
running any type of cartel is not an easy task."
In some cartel situations, the uncontrolled rivalry among cartel
members may be a partial antidote for the consumer welfare lost
by the collective constraints on competition.'" But not in every case.
Due to the restraints on price competition and rebating, as well as
other contributing characteristics peculiar to the international air
travel industry, the replacement of uniform agreements on retail
travel agent commissions by a regime of open commissions stimu-
lates inter-carrier rivalry of a sort that is inefficient and contrary to
the public interest.
98 (2d ed. 1974).
See Mills & Elzinga, Comment, Cartel Problems and Their Persistence,
AM. ECONOMIC REV. - (1978).
"I See Stigler, supra note 93.
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